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The Europeanization of Interest Mediation and Institutional Dynamics in an 
Extended Multi-level Governance System 
 
By 
 
Robert Kaiser 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Since the 1990s, the member states of the European Union (EU) have in an increasing 
number of cases agreed to pool their individual market power in order to valorize their 
bargaining position in various global governance arrangements. The most prominent 
examples of those interactions with multilateral regimes certainly are the World Trade 
Organization and the global climate regime. Against this background, this paper has a 
theoretical and an empirical aim. Concerning the theoretical perspective, the paper 
proposes an extended multi-level governance approach (eMLG) in order to analyze the 
dynamics of institutional change that emerge both at the EU and the member states’ level 
as a consequence of the agreement to Europeanize the mediation of national interests. 
Empirically, I refer to the example of global pharmaceutical regulation and I ask why 
even larger member states of the EU, such as Germany, engage in the Europeanization of 
interest mediation and under what conditions they are able to pursue their interests if the 
European Commission represents them at the global stage. In this respect I argue that not 
the size or the relative power of individual member states play a decisive role, but their 
ability to make use of the institutional multi-level structure. 
 
 
About the Author 
 
Robert Kaiser (Ph.D. from the University of Dusseldorf, 1997, Habilitation from the 
University of Munich, 2006) is Acting Chair for Governmental Studies at the University 
of Hamburg. His main fields of research are processes of Europeanization and 
institutional change in innovation, environmental and trade policies. He is the author of 
Innovationspolitik: Staatliche Steuerungskapazitäten beim Aufbau wissensbasierter 
Industrien im internationalen Vergleich (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008) and the Co-Author 
of “The Reconfiguration of National Innovation Systems” (Research Policy (2004) 33), 
“Managing Diversity in a System of Multi-level Governance” (Journal of European 
Public Policy (2004) 11), and “Missing the Lisbon Target? Multi-level Innovation 
Systems and the Challenge for EU Policy Coordination” (Journal of Public Policy (2005) 
25). 
 
 
 
 ii
 
Contact Information 
PD Dr. Robert Kaiser, Institute for Political Science, University of Hamburg, 
Allendeplatz 1, D-20146 Hamburg; E-Mail: mail@robert-kaiser.de, Homepage: 
www.robert-kaiser.de.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii
Preface 
 
This paper was presented during a conference on 'Germany in Global Economic 
Governance', which took place at Cornell University on Feb. 22/23, 2008. It was 
organized by Stefan Schirm (Ruhr University of Bochum) and Hubert Zimmermann 
(Cornell). We would like to thank our sponsors, the DAAD (German Academic 
Exchange Service), the Department of Government, the University of Bochum, the Mario 
Einaudi Center for International Studies, the Institute for European Studies as well as 
Peter Katzenstein (Cornell), who served as commentator. 
 
Germany, still the third or fourth largest global economy, has been particularly active in 
proposing a tighter regulation of international financial markets.  We use Germany as an 
exemplary case of how medium-sized countries can shape global governance and how the 
political economy of countries with coordinated market economies conditions their global 
governance strategies as compared to so-called liberal market economies, such as the 
United States and the United Kingdom.  With this focus, the project permits and initiates 
an overdue dialogue between the literatures on varieties of capitalism and on global 
governance, using global governance as the dependent variable. Another objective of the 
workshop was to address the dearth of country-specific case studies in research on global 
governance which often treats all states as essentially similar in their reaction to 
economic globalization. 
 
Contributors were asked to look at various areas of global governance (such as hedge 
fund regulation, IMF reform, Basel II, pharmaceutical regulation, corporate governance, 
transgovernmental standard-setting, etc). All papers identified several levels shaping the 
German position: the subnational, the European and the global level. The German 
government, with varying success, engaged in strategic forum-shopping among these 
levels. A further characteristic was close cooperation between state and non-state actors. 
Overall, the extent of Germany's capacity to shape global governance is surprisingly 
large. 
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Germany’s Role in Global Pharmaceutical Regulation: 
The Europeanization of Interest Mediation and Institutional Dynamics in an 
Extended Multi-level Governance System 
 
 
Introduction:  The Emergence of a Global Regime for Pharmaceutical Regulation1 
 
During the last three decades hardly any industrial sector has been affected by such a 
fundamental technological paradigm shift as it has occurred in the pharmaceutical 
industry. Today new biomedical technologies allow for, at least in principle, a process of 
rational drug design, which has overturned the fundamental logic of “trial and error” on 
which traditional pharmaceutical development processes were based. This paradigm shift 
from chemistry-driven to genomics-based drug development had many consequences 
(Grande/Kaiser 2006; Kaiser 2008a). The most important one certainly was that 
pharmaceutical companies became confronted with severe productivity and innovation 
problems. Although the expenditures for research and development have increased 
dramatically - those of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, for example, have multiplied 
tenfold between 1980 and 2001 - the number of market authorizations for new chemical 
entities has sharply decreased. As a consequence, mainly in the 1980s and 1990s 
pharmaceutical firms felt impelled to join forces and thus set off a wave of cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions within this industry.  
 
In parallel, governments in most industrialized countries have also reacted to these 
developments by the means of increasing public spending for biomedical research and the 
de- and re-regulation of the pharmaceutical development process. With respect to public 
spending, the U.S. National Institute of Health (NIH) boosted its annual budget for 
extramural research to more than 20 billion USD while the German federal government 
in the early 1990s started to invest some 750 million EUR per year into the establishment 
of a modern biotechnology industry (Kaiser 2008b: 21). In the United States, regulatory 
agencies came under increasing pressure, both from pharmaceutical companies as well as 
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the workshop “Germany in Global Economic 
Governance” at Cornell University, February 22, 2008. I would like to thank Peter J. Katzenstein, Daniel 
Kinderman, Andreas Nölke, Stefan A. Schirm, and Hubert Zimmermann for valuable comments. 
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from patient interest groups to deregulate the process of market authorization in order to 
bring innovative pharmaceuticals faster to the market. In the European Union, regulatory 
procedures for modern biopharmaceuticals were centralized in the mid-1990s thus 
providing for a single marketing authorization for the common market.  
 
In this context it served the interests of both pharmaceutical companies and governments 
to go a step further and to initiate a process of harmonization of pharmaceutical 
regulations at the global level. From a corporate view, the increasing costs for 
pharmaceutical innovations have a less serious impact if testing procedures for chemical 
entities are highly standardized on all major pharmaceutical markets. This especially 
holds because more than fifty percent of the overall costs for the development of a 
pharmaceutical product are directly related to clinical trials. Harmonization therefore 
significantly reduces the financial burden of pharmaceutical companies if clinical trials 
that were done and documented on the basis of common standards in one specific country 
would be widely acknowledged in others.  
 
Nation-states and their governments, however, have different reasons to perceive the 
global harmonization of pharmaceutical regulation as beneficial. This is mainly due to 
significant shifts of market shares that have occurred during the last decades. Germany, 
for example, enjoyed a reputation as “the pharmacy of the World” for the most part of the 
twentieth century with constant World market shares of about 40 percent. Since the 
1970s, however, this market share has fallen gradually to 8 percent and has been further 
on cut to half during the 1990s.  
 
Therefore, from a German perspective the global harmonization of regulatory standards 
would primarily compensate for a shrinking home market as it might also improve the 
country’s competitive position on the market for clinical trials. The United States, in 
contrast, today represents a global market share of almost 50 percent. In this situation 
better access to international markets is not per se a strong argument for international 
cooperation. Given the fact, however, that the U.S. is also one of the very few countries 
in the World that has by far and large not implemented yet price controls on 
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pharmaceutical products, the country’s health system is confronted with a situation in 
which domestic pharmaceutical companies are able, if not to some extent forced, to re-
finance their R&D investments mainly at the home market. Faster access to foreign 
markets would therefore at least to some extent relieve the U.S. health system from these 
costs. 
 
The kind of institutional arrangement that was chosen in 1990 when the “International 
Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of 
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use” (ICH) was established certainly reflected the common 
interests of companies and governments in the leading pharmaceutical markets. The ICH 
was set up as a consensus-driven trilateral initiative, comprised of representatives from 
regulatory agencies and pharmaceutical industry organizations from Europe, Japan and 
the United States. As such it was able to build upon a series of bilateral mutual 
recognition agreements that had been concluded earlier among these countries, which had 
in 2003 a combined World market share in pharmaceutical products of almost 90 percent. 
Even though the ICH from the beginning invited regulatory agencies from other countries 
to become observers to this new organization, priorities for harmonization and methods 
of implementation have been clearly defined within the trilateral context. 
 
This paper aims at answering two questions that are closely related to the assessment of 
Germany’s current role in global pharmaceutical regulation. The first question is why 
even larger EU member states, such as Germany, agreed to Europeanize the mediation of 
national interests in this field. From what has been said already it is obvious that the 
German government may strengthen its position in multilateral arenas by pooling its 
individual pharmaceutical market power with other European countries that together have 
an aggregated World market share of roughly 30 percent. This argument alone is, 
however, not sufficient. This is mainly because of the fact that the Europeanization of the 
mediation of interests takes place within a specific institutional structure, which can be 
characterized best as an extended system of multi-level governance (eMLG). Therefore, 
the second question raised in this paper is under what conditions EU member states are 
able to pursue their interests in such an institutional structure. In this respect I argue that 
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not the size or the relative power of individual member states play a decisive role, but 
their ability to make use of the institutional multi-level structure. As a consequence, the 
member states’ influence on the Global regime for pharmaceutical regulation largely 
depends on their ability to adapt their domestic regulatory system to the institutional 
structure that has been established at the European level. 
 
In order to develop this argument the next section will firstly identify the four specific 
reasons why it was rational for the EU member states to delegate the task of 
representation within the ICH to the European Commission and thus initiated the 
establishment of an extended multi-level governance system even in this policy area. 
Subsequently, section 3 will turn to the three institutional characteristics of this multi-
level system. Here it will be firstly shown that the delegation of representation took place 
only under the condition of ongoing tight control of the EU Commission’s activities 
exercised by the member states’ governments. Moreover, even the Europeanization of 
interest mediation does not necessarily mean that European institutions are in full charge 
of the representation of the European Union. Rather, the European scientific 
representatives within ICH committees are in fact national experts who participate on 
behalf of the European regulatory agency for pharmaceutical products (EMEA) that has 
to rely on national expertise since its own resources are extraordinary limited compared 
to regulatory agencies in Japan or the United States. Secondly, within this extended 
multi-level governance system the supranational legal system of the European Union 
provides for the opportunity to transform globally agreed soft-law into compulsory 
Community hard-law and therefore guarantees not only a certain degree of harmonization 
within the EU, but also compliance with ICH recommendations toward third countries. 
And thirdly, the extended multi-level governance system induces considerable pressure 
on the member states to evaluate the performance of their domestic regulatory systems. 
Section 4 will expatiate on this point and will provide the crucial empirical evidence for 
the claim that the institutional structure of the eMLG system creates a retroactive pressure 
for institutional reforms at the national level. In more concrete terms, there has been 
increasing pressure on the member states to adapt to a new “superior” regulatory model 
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in order to maintain influence on European and Global processes of pharmaceutical 
regulation. Finally, section five will summarize the main theoretical and empirical 
conclusions.  
 
The National Rationale for the Europeanization of Interest Mediation in Global 
Pharmaceutical Regulation  
 
There are basically four interdependent reasons why EU member states agreed at the end 
of the 1980s to pool their market power and mediate their interests in global 
pharmaceutical regulation at the European level. 
 
The first reason can be seen in the attempt of the European Union to substantiate its own 
ambitions to establish a European single market for pharmaceutical products with a 
related global initiative. In fact, it was the European Commission that proposed such an 
initiative at the end of the 1980s in a number of bilateral discussions with regulatory 
agencies in Japan and the United States. These bilateral discussions materialized in a plan 
of action agreed upon at the WHO Conference of Drug Regulatory Agencies (ICDRA) in 
Paris in 1989. The formal establishment of the ICH followed only a few months later 
(April 1990) at a meeting hosted by the European Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Industries’ Associations (EFPIA) in Brussels. Therefore, the ICH initiative as well as the 
establishment of a common European approach towards drug regulation took place at the 
same time. Only in 1987, the European Council decided to end a cumbersome and less 
effective process of mutual recognition of national drug approvals that was initiated 
already in 1963 (Vogel 1998).  A new centralized approach towards the harmonization of 
market authorization procedures for novel biopharmaceutical drugs thus paved the way 
for the establishment of the European Medicines Agency (EMEA) in 1995. This turn 
towards positive, market shaping, integration at the European level certainly was a central 
precondition for the ICH process. 
 
Traditionally, countries that have a significant pharmaceutical industry dealt with the 
problem of trans-border trade in pharmaceutical products by the conclusion of Mutual 
Recognition Agreements (MRAs) or Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between the 
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competent regulatory agencies that provided both for the general acceptance of other 
countries’ regulatory frameworks for the testing and production of pharmaceuticals, but 
also for the inspection of foreign production facilities. The existence of these agreements 
was and still is an important precondition for the liberalization of trade in pharmaceutical 
products, which accelerated in course of an agreement on the elimination of customs 
duties reached by 23 countries during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Both MRAs and MOUs are, however, mainly concerned with 
the issues of public safety and consumer protection. They are typical tools of negative 
integration in the sense that they have a market-making character while reducing the 
states’ capacities to control the quality and security of foreign products on the home 
market.2 Positive integration, in contrast, not only aims at common standards for the 
development and production of pharmaceuticals it also tackles the problem of faster 
access to markets for and better supply with novel innovative drugs. Against this 
background, the ICH effort to harmonize respective regulations also is a process of 
market-shaping positive integration by which national regulatory agencies regain control 
over the methods and standards for the production of pharmaceuticals outside their own 
jurisdiction (Scharpf 1996). 
  
A second reason for the delegation of representation in pharmaceutical regulation 
certainly is that the EU, representing a population of more than 500 million people, 
accumulates a substantial economic weight that provides for the opportunity to export 
internal standards to the outside World. This means that the pure size of the market 
compensates for the relatively weak position in which the European member states are in 
terms of their respective pharmaceutical industries. Although seven of the 20 largest 
pharmaceutical companies in the World are based within the European Union, in 2002 
                                                 
2 Even the capacities of the U.S. Federal Food and Drug Administration provide only on a 
rather limited scale for conducting inspections of foreign production facilities that 
produce pharmaceuticals that are exported to the United States. See “Testimony on the 
Agreement on Mutual Recognition between the United States and the European 
Community by Sharon Smith Holston  Deputy Commissioner for External Affairs, Food 
and Drug Administration Before the House Committee on Commerce, Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations  October 2, 1998. 
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those companies had an aggregated World market share of only 20 percent. European 
pharmaceutical companies contributed only two pharmaceutical products to the list of the 
10 top-selling drugs. Moreover, they hardly play any role on the Japanese market, which 
is the second largest national market in the World. In terms of market sales only two 
companies are ranked (on 13th and 14th position) on the list of the 20 leading companies. 
 
Therefore it is not the strength of the industrial base, but the existence of harmonized 
rules and regulations for the access to 27 national pharmaceutical markets that provides 
the EU Commission with a significant amount of negotiation power in Global 
arrangements for pharmaceutical regulation. With respect to the ICH harmonization 
process it has been argued that the European Union “has found it the easiest to adjust to 
the ICH guidelines”, because “most guidelines largely overlap with current EC 
legislation” (Vogel 1998: 14). This shows that the Europeanization of pharmaceutical 
regulation made it possible that the EU member states successfully pursued their 
collective interests. And even beyond the topic of pharmaceutical regulation there are 
indications that the European Union increased its influence in Global standardization 
processes. The judgment that the EU is becoming the world’s chief regulator (The 
Economist, September 20, 2007) might be a little bit premature. Nevertheless, there is of 
course a competition in many fields between the U.S. cost-benefit approach toward 
regulation and the emphasis of the precautionary principle that guides European 
regulation. 
 
A third reason for the mediation of interests at the European level is that the 
Europeanization of pharmaceutical regulation strengthens the coherence between the 
different EU external policies. This is because the ICH is embedded in a broader network 
of international and regional organizations, such as the World Health Organization 
(WHO), the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA), as well as of other national regulatory agencies and private actors who have 
become observers to the ICH process. Given this, the ICH is a typical example of global 
economic governance defined as a multilateral and rule-based management system for the 
steering of the World economy (Schirm 2004: 237). In this context, ICH guidelines do 
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not only provide for common standards among participating parties, they also lower the 
risk for member states to violate the rules of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT) since the WTO, as an organization that imports standards from other 
international rule-making authorities, explicitly calls upon its member states to adopt 
those internationally agreed standards (Gstöhl/Kaiser 2004). Therefore, from a European 
perspective the coherence of EU external policies is likely to increase if the European 
Commission represents the Union in the various multilateral fora that are concerned with 
different aspects of pharmaceutical regulation, such as patenting, risk regulation or the 
prevention from epidemics. 
 
A fourth and final reason for EU member state governments to support the establishment 
of this extended multi-level governance system for pharmaceutical regulation exists 
because it facilitates the implementation of new regulatory arrangements at the domestic 
level. In this respect, Germany constitutes a strong case for the persistence and stability 
of a tripartistic institutional arrangement comprised of representatives from the Federal 
Chamber of Physicians (“Bundesärztekammer”), the German Society for Internal 
Medicine (“Gesellschaft für Innere Medizin”) and the federal health office 
(“Bundesgesundheitsamt”) as the public authority that granted marketing authorizations. 
This institutional arrangement can be characterized as a rather “closed shop” of tightly 
coupled actors who were hardly susceptible to the interests of the pharmaceutical industry 
as well as of patient interest groups. Outside Germany, in contrast, regulatory agencies 
both in the United States and in other European countries have reacted to the pressure for 
a more innovation-oriented regulation by a stronger involvement especially of the 
pharmaceutical industry.  
 
In the United States, for example, interactions between the FDA and industry have 
undoubtedly increased since the enactment of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 
1992, which entitled the FDA to collect substantial application fees from drug 
manufacturers in order to fund new drug approval processes. In Europe, the EMEA has 
been explicitly designed as a “service provider” for the pharmaceutical industry. 
Consequently, the agency acts under the supervision of the Enterprise and Industry 
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Directorate General of the European Commission and not under the supervision of the 
unit responsible for health and consumer protection. At the member states’ level the 
British regulatory agency, the Medicines and Health Care Products Regulatory Agency 
(MHRA), has been widely considered as a role model for an efficient (in terms of the 
duration of approval procedures) institutional arrangement for pharmaceutical regulation. 
More recently, however, it has come under enormous political pressure because of the 
close relationship of some of its employees with the pharmaceutical industry and because 
of the fact that decisions made by the MHRA were based on insufficient information 
provided by pharmaceutical companies (House of Commons 2005). Within this context 
the stability of the tripartistic German regulatory network became precarious both 
because of its relatively weak performance in dealing with applications for marketing 
authorizations of novel drugs and because of the competition that has emerged between 
national regulatory agencies within the extended multi-level governance system.  
 
The Institutional Characteristics of the Extended Multi-level Governance System 
for Pharmaceutical Regulation  
 
Up to now the concept of an extended system of multi-level governance has not very 
much advanced neither in theoretical nor in empirical terms. There are only few studies 
that have analyzed how the international embeddedness of the European Union affects 
both regulatory processes at the Global level and related policy-making processes within 
the European sphere. However, there is at least some evidence that the membership of the 
European Union in the World Trade Organization led to institutional change within the 
EU. In this respect, it has been shown that the embeddedness of the EU within this 
international context has not only affected the formal organization of the European 
decision- making process, but also internal routines, guiding ideas and concepts of 
legitimate order (Knodt 2004, Billiet 2006). In order to make full use of the concept of an 
extended multi-level governance system, we also have to dip into different dynamics of 
institutional adaption at the member states level. This leads to the assumption that an 
extended multi-level governance system has at least three distinct characteristics that are 
fundamental to the understanding of these institutional dynamics. 
 
  
 
10 
 
The first feature concerns the rules and procedures that apply to decision-making within 
the European Union both in regard to internal rules and regulations, but also with respect 
to the determination of common European positions for negotiations at the Global level. 
Although we can assume that they differ to some extent across policy fields, we can draw 
some principle assessments from the literature on multi-level governance in Europe. 
Hence, a system of multi-level governance reflects “a polity creating process in which 
authority and policy-making influence are shared across multiple levels of government” 
(Hooghe and Marks 2001: 2). In this respect, it is widely accepted that the European 
multi-level polity is characterized both by a dynamic dispersion of authority and a non-
hierarchical institutional design (Kaiser/Prange 2002). 
 
This means that decision-making competencies are dispersed across territorial levels, i.e. 
across supranational, national, and regional or local actors, or allocated sideways, which 
means e.g. to quasi-autonomous agencies or to non-public implementation bodies 
(Majone 1996). With regard to aspects of authority relocation it is of special importance 
that in contrast to federal systems, in a multi-level governance system the interactions 
between the different levels are not “disciplined” by constitutional norms, which results 
in a considerable competition for competencies (Grande 2001; Peters and Pierre 2002).  
 
In the case of pharmaceutical regulation the establishment of the EMEA clearly reflects 
this institutional feature, as this regulatory agency is largely dependent on human and 
knowledge resources provided by the member states as well as on the confirmation of its 
recommendations for marketing authorizations by member states’ delegates. 
Accordingly, the EMEA is still a largely member states and consensus-driven 
organization. Consensual decision-making is obligatory, for example, in the Committee 
for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP) where representatives from national 
regulatory agencies conclude on recommendations for the decision on the market 
authorization of new drugs. The final “political decision” has to be taken by member 
states representatives that come together in the European Commission’s Standing 
Committee on Medicinal Products for Human Use. Here the decisions can be taken by 
majority voting.  
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Nevertheless, even in the whole process of drug evaluation the EMEA has to rely mainly 
on the 47 national agencies that conduct the required procedures and provide the 
scientific advice for the final decision on market authorization. Even this short 
description indicates that there are enormous organizational differences between the 
EMEA and the U.S. Federal Food and Drug Administration, which especially concern the 
respective resources of the agencies and their dependency on “external” actors. In 
contrast to the FDA, the EMEA is certainly not a powerful independent regulatory 
agency. It is better characterized as a hub of a European network of national regulatory 
agencies. Because of that the actual influence of the different national agencies at the 
European level is largely dependent on their respective scientific expertise and their 
capabilities in the process of evaluating new pharmaceutical products. 
Table 1: Comparison of organizational features of the EMEA and the FDA3 
 EMEA FDA 
 
Established in 1995 1931 
 
Budget for 2001 EUR 62 million (of which 
70 percent originated from 
the pharmaceutical industry) 
EUR 1,450 million (of 
which 10 percent originated 
from the pharmaceutical 
Industry and Innovation 
 
Permanent Stuff 250 9,000 
 
Evaluations done by External experts (each 
member state appoints two 
of them) 
Internal Stuff (with advice 
from external experts) 
 
Whereas the process of granting market authorization for new drugs already reflects the 
typical non-hierarchical and consensual decision-making structure of the European multi-
level governance system, pharmaceutical regulation in Europe seeks not only consensus 
among member states, but also with industry. In this respect it has been rightly argued 
that the pharmaceutical industry has an “insider status” within the European Commission 
                                                 
3  Data for table 1 originate from Garattini/Bertele (2004: 87). 
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and its various committees that are concerned with pharmaceutical regulation 
(Permanand/Altenstetter 2004: 42). This holds especially for corporate participation in 
the High Level Group on Innovation and the Provision of Medicines (called “G10 
Medicines”) that was set up by the European Commission in 2000 in order to give policy 
advice on the various topics of health policy. This group is chaired by the European 
Commission and comprised of national Health Ministers from seven member states, as 
well as representatives from the European Parliament, the pharmaceutical industry and 
patient organizations. 
 
The various feedback loops and co-decision procedures that exist on the one hand 
between the European Commission, the EMEA and the pharmaceutical industry and, on 
the other hand, with the member states governments and their regulatory agencies clearly 
show that within the European polity actors and arenas are not ordered hierarchically, so 
that “supranational institutions are not hierarchically superimposed upon the member 
states; and the member states and their regions are not subordinated to the supranational 
powers” (Grande 2001: 7). Rather, “political arenas are interconnected rather than 
nested” (Marks et al. 1996: 346f), which means that even subnational actors do not only 
operate at the national, but also at the supranational levels.  
 
These interactions are also constitutive for the European Union’s participation in the ICH 
process. Although only the European Union, through the pharmaceutical unit of the 
European Commission, and the EMEA and its working groups are represented at the ICH 
the member states have a significant influence on this process.  
 
Accordingly, the member states are able to pursue their interests by using the various 
channels and arenas that exist within the European system of multi-level governance for 
pharmaceutical regulation and policy. In this respect, however, the institutional 
complexity at the European level is not the only difficulty, because the member states 
differ to some extent in terms of the domestic organization of competences for 
pharmaceutical regulation. 
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Therefore, in the German case the high degree of horizontal and vertical differentiation of 
responsibilities for pharmaceutical regulation is of importance. In the German federal 
system the authority to grant market authorizations for drugs rests with the federal level if 
the application has not been made under the centralized European procedure. The 
German states are responsible, inter alia, for the monitoring of clinical trials, 
pharmaceutical production processes and the distribution of drugs. They coordinate their 
activities through the Conference of the Health Ministers of the German states, which 
convene at least once a year, and the Central Authority of the states for Health Protection 
with regard to Medicinal Products and Medical Devices (ZLG). The horizontal 
differentiation at the federal level exists because of the political responsibility of the 
Federal Ministry of Health (BMG), the responsibility for market authorizations of the 
Federal Institute for Medicinal Products and Medicinal Devices (BfArM), which is a 
subordinate authority of the BMG, the Paul-Ehrlich-Institute, a research agency that also 
operates under the supervision of the BMG, which is responsible for market 
authorizations of sera, vaccines, blood preparations, and gene transfer medicinal 
products, and the Robert-Koch-Institute, another research agency of the BMG, that is 
mainly responsible for the prevention of infections. As a consequence, all actors within 
the German regulatory system for pharmaceuticals are to a certain extent concerned with 
regulatory aspects that have been harmonized within the European or the ICH context. In 
view of the global level, however, German representatives become engaged within the 
ICH context only as European experts or delegates. That is why it is crucial to understand 
the degree, the nature, and the dynamics of the national influence at the European level. 
In this respect, figure 1 provides an overview of the multi-level institutional architecture 
that exists in pharmaceutical regulation.  
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Figure 1:  German actors within the extended multi-level system of pharmaceutical 
regulation 
 
From a German perspective, the main important actors are the Federal Ministry of Health, 
which is represented in the Council of the European Union and its Working Group on 
Pharmaceuticals, in the EMEA, and in the Commission’s pharmaceutical Committee as 
well as in the Standing Committee on medicinal products for human use. The German 
pharmaceutical regulatory agency BfArM delegates experts and representatives to EMEA 
and it is represented in coordination group of the Heads of European regulatory agencies. 
The German states are engaged in this multi-level structure by sending representatives of 
the ZLG into the Commission’s pharmaceutical committee (who are officially mandated 
by the Federal Council) and by comprehensive rights to participate in European 
legislation (via the Council of Ministers of the EU) that exist for the Federal Council. 
These participation procedures are of some importance for the process of global 
pharmaceutical regulation, since ICH guidelines are transformed in Europe into formal 
legislative directives. Most of them have to be, according to the distribution of powers 
within the German federal system, implemented by the German states. 
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In order to evaluate as to how this institutional structure is active in processes of global 
harmonization of pharmaceutical regulation one has to keep in mind that the EU is 
represented at ICH level only by the European Commission and EMEA. Within the 
European Commission, the pharmaceutical unit is responsible for all ICH related 
activities. However, it has to coordinate its activities with the Pharmaceutical Committee 
that is comprised of members of national governments (and in the German case even of a 
representative from the states) and regulatory agencies. This committee meets every six 
months. In contrast to the European Commission, the EMEA allows for participation of 
national representatives within the ICH context as delegated experts of EMEA. In this 
respect, the German regulatory agency (BfArM) has delegated experts in five ICH 
working groups. 
 
The second institutional feature of this extended multi-level governance system is that it 
provides for a solution to transform standards and recommendations agreed upon at the 
Global level into compulsory law within the European polity. This feature is of high 
importance especially if Global governance arrangements produce, as it is often be the 
case, non-binding soft law. This process of transformation of soft-law into compulsory 
Community hard-law is taking place in a number of policy areas in which the European 
Union has external competences. In the field of health and consumer policy, for example, 
the EU became a member of the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) in 2003. Since 
that time, some CAC standards have been introduces into EU legislation in areas such as 
recommendations concerning microbiological criteria for foodstuffs. In terms of the 
Global climate regime the EU member states committed themselves to a common EU 
emission trading system, which is the main tool by which the member states intend to 
meet their obligations from the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
With respect to ICH recommendations (for details on the specific measures taken by the 
ICH see Vogel 1998 and Daemmrich 2004) it is important to notice that within the 
European sphere there is a transformation into hard law taking place since the European 
Commission can use the tool of formal directives to steer the implement these 
recommendations at the member states level. Within ICH, as in other global governance 
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arrangements, the legalization by soft law (Shelton 2000) is a superior institutional 
solution as it is easier to achieve, as it protects the actor’s autonomy and as it facilitates 
compromise “between actors with different interests and values, different time horizons 
and discount rates, and different degrees of power” (Abbott/Snidal 2000: 423). The 
critical question is, of course, under which conditions actors will comply with soft 
regulations.  
 
Generally, compliance with soft regulations should be supported by long-term 
relationships between actors and their shared belief that these regulations maximize 
welfare while minimizing transaction costs. Within this extended multi-level system for 
pharmaceutical regulation long-term relationships are likely to evolve because of the 
increasing homogeneity of actor constellations that exist at the Global, the European and 
the national level. We will discuss this aspect in some more detail later in this section. 
Since the early 1990s, the process of transformation into hard-law is a rather complex one 
and can be exemplified by the ICH guidelines on Good Clinical Practice (GCP) agreed 
upon in 1995. At the European level the EMEA Committee for Proprietary Medicinal 
Products approved these guidelines in 1996.  However, the EU Directive on principles 
and detailed guidelines for good clinical practice (2001/2005) only required that these 
guidelines “should be taken into account”. Accordingly, the ICH guidelines assumed 
compulsory character only with the implementation at the member states level. In 
Germany, for example, the EU directive was implemented in 2006 through the revision of 
the German Medicinal Products Act, which contains no direct reference to the ICH 
guidelines. Rather, the German regulatory authorities for pharmaceutical products issued 
an official notice on the revised law in which they made clear that the requirements for an 
application for marketing authorization of a medicinal product are generally defined by 
the CPMP’s approved version of the ICH guidelines for clinical trials.4 
 
The third institutional feature of this extended multi-level governance system consists of 
the fact that the degree to which national actors get involved is less determined by formal 
                                                 
4 See “Dritte Bekanntmachung zur klinischen Prüfung von Arzneimitteln am Menschen”, Bonn: BfArM, 
10.08.2006. 
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rules, but largely depend on their ability to contribute to the performance of the common 
regulatory system. Accordingly, the degree to which national interests can be pursued in 
the process of global pharmaceutical regulation largely depends on the capability to make 
use of the European multi-level policy-making structure. This is mainly because the 
European Commission and the EMEA need the support and input from the member states 
in order to negotiate effectively at the global level. This essentially leads to the fact that 
member states compete with each other for influence and status within the multi-level 
governance system. Although this institutional feature can explain certain dynamics of 
institutional change at the member states level, it has been widely ignored by the 
literature on the European engagement in multilateral governance arrangements. 
Consequently, the next section will take a closer look on these dynamics. 
 
The Retroactive Pressure: Institutional Adjustments at the National Level  
In the field of pharmaceutical regulation, the Europeanization of interest mediation has 
clearly increased the pressure at least on some member states to adjust their domestic 
institutional structure to a specific model established both at the European and Global 
levels. For the German case, this argument is well documented primarily by two 
developments: firstly, by the federal government’s attempt to set up a new independent 
regulatory agency for the pharmaceutical sector and, secondly, by measures taken by the 
German states to intensify their coordination in fields of subnational competences. 
 
The German states, for example, agreed on an Inter-state accord, which went into force in 
1994, and thereby centralized their competencies in the field of supervision of 
pharmaceutical production. This initiative was taken as a response to the Europeanization 
of regulation of pharmaceuticals and medical devices. Therefore, the newly established 
Central Authority of the states for Health Protection with regard to Medicinal Products 
and Medical Devices (ZLG) was established as the single national contact point for the 
European Commission with regard to the safety of medicinal devices and pharmaceutical 
drugs. Within this context, the ZLG is primarily responsible for the certification of new 
medicinal products and for the participation in foreign inspections of pharmaceutical 
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production facilities that take place on the basis on Mutual Recognition Agreements that 
have been concluded by the European Union. Because of the latter responsibility the ZLG 
is also a member of the EMEA Ad-hoc Working Group of Inspections Services. 
 
The Europeanization of pharmaceutical regulation made institutional reforms much more 
inevitable at the national level. Since 1994, the German tripartistic regulatory regime has 
been dissolved in three main steps. The first step was marked by the reorganization of the 
federal health office into three independent and specialized agencies of which one, the 
Federal Institute for Medicinal Products and Medicinal Devices (BfArM) became 
responsible for the decision on marketing authorizations for new pharmaceutical and 
medicinal products. In parallel, the Federal Chamber of Physicians and the German 
Society for Internal Medicine lost their privileged role within the regulatory system, but 
they maintained some influence as consultants for the BfArM. At first sight, this 
reorganization was an immediate reaction to a political scandal that arose because of the 
detection of HIV-contaminated blood bottles. Closer inspection, however, reveals that 
there had been already before an ongoing discussion about organizational deficits within 
the federal office, which suffered from a significant increase of responsibilities in various 
fields of health and environmental protection.  
 
The second step is characterized by a number of political initiatives that were taken 
during the last decade with the aim of improving the performance of the new federal 
institute. Although the BfArM had been established exclusively for the regulation of 
pharmaceuticals and medicinal products, it proofed to be incapable of achieving 
sufficient results. This was mainly because of the fact that the BfArM invested heavily in 
doing preliminary work for European authorization procedures at the expense of 
applications for the domestic market. With 26 months the average duration of procedures 
for national marketing authorizations was more than three times longer than required by 
law. But even though the BfArM had focused very much on its involvement in European 
regulatory processes it still seemed to be ill prepared to obtain an appropriate position at 
the European level. According to an official evaluation of the agency’s work done by the 
German Science and Humanities Council (“Wissenschaftsrat”) in 2004, the BfArM 
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clearly underperformed in terms of the frequency of its employment as a “rapporteur” in 
market authorization applications under the centralized European procedure. Moreover, 
the Council especially criticized the low engagement in in-house research and an 
insufficient availability of human resources (Wissenschaftsrat 2004). 
 
These results were considered alarming especially in view of the intention of the EMEA 
to reduce significantly the number of national regulatory authorities that will participate 
in future regulatory processes at the European level. As mentioned before, currently there 
are 47 national agencies that provide scientific expertise and regulatory assistance to the 
EMEA. In the meantime, however, the European Commission has announced its 
intention to significantly reduce the number of supporting national agencies by 
recognizing only a few national “centers of excellence”. It is conceivable that the 
selection of those centers will most likely depend on their previous performance at the 
European level. In this respect, a center of excellence in the European pharmaceutical 
research will be required to act as a full-service agency that is capable of dealing with all 
areas of medical indication. Apart from that is should also be specialized in a certain field 
of competence. 
 
Therefore the third step was initiated by the federal government’s reaction to both the 
results of the evaluation as well as to the plans of the European Commission to reduce the 
number of national authorities in the European regulatory framework.  
 
In February 2007, it introduced a federal law establishing a new German Agency for 
Pharmaceutical and Medicinal Products (DAMA). In the official explanatory statement to 
the law the federal government made explicitly clear that a new institutional structure is 
needed in order to be able to compete with other member states’ regulatory authorities. 
The legislative proposal designs the DAMA as a fully autonomous regulatory agency 
under public law, which will be free to define its organizational routines and to determine 
the deployment of its financial means and human resources. The DAMA will also follow 
the example of the EMEA and other European regulatory agencies in view of the role of 
applications fees of the pharmaceutical industry. In this respect, the federal government 
  
 
20 
 
expects that the DAMA’s revenues will cover the costs for market authorizations. And 
finally, the legislative proposal anticipates that the national and international reputation of 
the DAMA will largely depend on its internal research capacities. It is therefore 
determined that the DAMA will be obliged to continuously increase its expenditures for 
research (Deutscher Bundestag 2007).  
 
However, it is remarkable that Germany has not been able yet to accomplish this third 
step of institutional adaption at the national level. A first attempt to put the related bill 
through failed in 2005 because of the early elections. Since that election the country is 
currently by a great coalition with a large majority in the federal parliament. Nevertheless 
the legislative proposal failed again, because it was shipwrecked by a relatively small 
number of coalition deputies even before the ballot vote who were worried that the 
financial contributions from the pharmaceutical industry could undermine the 
independency of the DAMA. Therefore, as for now the institutional adaption will be 
going on as a process of reorganization of the BfArM.  
 
Conclusions: Germany’s Role in Global Pharmaceutical Regulation  
 
The first aim of this paper has been to discuss the value of the concept of an extended 
multi-level governance approach for the analysis of those new arrangements of global 
governance in which the European Union acts on behalf of its member states. One 
example of such an arrangement is the International Conference on Harmonization of 
Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, which has 
made substantial progress towards the harmonization of various regulations regarding 
pharmaceutical development processes during the last 18 years.  
 
In this respect it has been shown that it was rational for the EU member states to agree on 
the Europeanization of interest mediation in pharmaceutical regulation. This is mainly 
because of three reasons. Firstly, a common European engagement within the ICH 
contributes to the substantiation of the new intra-EU approach towards regulating a single 
European market for pharmaceutical products. Secondly, the offer to provide a 
harmonized access to 27 national pharmaceutical markets gives the European 
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Commission substantial negotiation power that can be used to export European standards 
to the main important third country markets. And thirdly, the delegation of representation 
to the European Commission is considered an important contribution to facilitate 
coherence between the different EU external policies, which affect various aspects of 
pharmaceutical regulation. 
 
In terms of the extended multi-level governance system (eMLG) it has been further 
shown that such a system has at least three specific institutional characteristics. Firstly, in 
an eMLG system regulatory competences are not simply centralized. On the contrary, it is 
primarily characterized by its non-hierarchical institutional design and by the dynamic 
dispersion of authority. Secondly, such as system provides for a modus to transform 
globally agreed soft-law into compulsory Community hard-law and thus guarantees 
compliance with non-binding international norms.  Thirdly, within an extended multi-
level governance system the member states come under certain pressure to adapt their 
domestic institutions. There are reasons to assume that multi-level dynamics may differ to 
some extent across policy areas. However, the key argument here is that the member 
states’ actual influence on policy processes within such an eMLG system is not primarily 
determined by their size or relative market power, but by their ability to make use of the 
multi-level structure. Hence, from a theoretical perspective the most striking aspect of 
policy-making processes in an eMLG system is that it provides for coordination both by 
negotiation and competition between member states. Consequently, in order to grasp the 
complexity of the institutional dynamics within an extended multi-level governance 
system it is necessary to analyze not only the member states’ activities at the European 
level, but also their domestic adjustments. 
 
Therefore, the empirical aim of the paper has been to look at the German role within the 
processes of European and Global pharmaceutical regulation. From such a member 
state’s perspective, Germany certainly constitutes a special case. Once a country that 
dominated the World pharmaceutical market its role has significantly decreased since the 
second half of the twentieth century. Therefore, the Europeanization of interest mediation 
should have been a promising strategy to pursue national interests. It has been shown, 
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however, that such a strategy can also be successful under the condition that national 
actors succeed in making use of the various channels of interaction within the multi-level 
system. That is why both national and subnational actors introduced substantial 
institutional reforms that were aimed at improving their influence at the European level. 
Moreover, the example of the proposal to establish a new regulatory agency shows that 
the process of institutional adjustment is far from over. On the contrary, until now 
Germany did not succeed in adapting to a new “superior” model of pharmaceutical 
regulation that is characterized by “service-oriented” and “research-driven” regulatory 
authorities that provide support both to the pharmaceutical industry and the European 
regulatory network while generating a certain amount of exclusive influence through the 
development of particular competence areas. In this respect, the DAMA proposal was 
certainly targeted at this new role model, but – for the time being – failed because of 
increasing criticism on the appropriateness of close interrelations between regulators and 
industry.  
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